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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Board ruled that it would not entertain an unfair labor practice charge unless the
parties had exhausted remedies available under the contract.
The present case answers another of the many questions raised by §301 and
represents a further recognition of the valuable function of arbitration in labormanagement relations.
John H. Galvin
Delayed Disposition of Remainder Interests to Testator's Heirs Where Life
Tenant is sole Heir
Testatrix in her will provided a life estate for her husband with a power
to invade principal in the case of necessity. The remainder of her estate she
devised as follows: "Upon the death of my husband, I give, devise, and bequeath
such of my property as shall then remain to my distributees under the laws of the
State of New York." The Surrogate in construing the will determined the beneficiaries of the remainder to be the testatrix's distributees at the time of her
death. At that time her husband was her sole distributee under New York law,1
and because of the merger of his life estate and his remainder, he would have
received the whole of her property in fee. In In re Carlin's Will the Appellate
Division reversed the Surrogate and held that the will on its face evidenced an
intention that the husband should receive no more than a life interest in the
property 2 To give effect to that intention the Court held that the beneficiaries of
the remainder should be determined at the husband's death.
The basic canon of will construction is that the intention of the testator
evidenced by the will will be given effect. Where the intention is shown by
dear, unambiguous language in the will there is little difficulty in giving effect to
the intention. However, where the language is less clear, some standards or
rules must be applied in construing the will. Over a long period of time certain
more or less arbitrary canons and rules of construction have developed. These
rules, which are applied only when the will is ambiguous and clear intent is
lacking, reflect both an attempt to give effect to the probable intention of the
average testator and the general policies concerning property with which the
courts have been concerned. One of these rules, which has developed largely
out of the preference for the early vesting of future interests, is that in the
absence of dear and direct intention to the contrary, heirs and distributees under
3
a will will be determined at the death of the testator.
1. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §§47-c, 83-d.
2. 6 A.D.2d 281, 176 N.Y.S.2d 112 (4th Dep't 1958).
3. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §22.60, note 23 at 442 (Casner ed. 1952).
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Many jurisdictions hold that when a testator devises a limited estate to one
party and a remainder to a class, the fact that the holder of the limited estate
subsequently turns out to be the sole member of the class of remaindermen,
would result in an incongruity which is some evidence that the testator did not
intend the class to include the life tenant.4 This inference of intention is
strengthened in a case like Carlin in which at the time the will was drawn it was
fairly certain that the life tenant would be testator's sole heir,5 but unless there is
some additional evidence indicating testator's intention to exclude the life tenant
from the remainder, the courts generally will not do so.6 If it is determined that
testator did not intent to include the holder of the limited estate in the class of
remaindermen there are two means by which this intention can be given effect.
The class membership can be determined at testator's death as if the life tenant
were then also dead, or the class membership can be determined as if testator
died at the time of the life tenant's death.
In the absence of express language directing the postponement of the
determination of heirs or a class of beneficiaries under a will, New York courts
have seldom found sufficient intention to do so. In In re Bump's Will the fact
that a life tenant was a member of the class receiving a present gift of a remainder
was not sufficient to delay determination of the class.7 The decision in that case
relied on the general rule in favor of early vesting and the fact that the will did
not evidence a clear, contrary intention. The rule of that case has been followed
where the will provided an immediate gift of the remainder.8 However, it has
not been followed in those cases where the gift was not a present gift. Where
the will provided that the remainder be divided and distributed upon the death
of the life tenant, 9 or where the gift was substitutional or conditional upon the
happening of a future event,10 the determination of the distributees has generally
been delayed. In re .Sayre's Will delayed the determination of testator's heirs
principally because the gift was substitutional in nature, but in its discussion of
the case the court placed some weight upon the fact that an opposite result would
be incongruous with the intention testator had shown in the will."
4. RESTATEIENT, PROPERTY §308(k) (1940); 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY
§22.60 (Casner ed. 1952).
5. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §22.60 at 442 (Casner ed. 1952).
6. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §22.60 at 443 (Casner ed. 1952).
7. 234 N.Y. 60, 136 N.E. 295 (1922).
8. In re Roth, 234 App. Div. 474, 255 N.Y.Supp. 307 (1st Dep't 1932); In re
White's Will, 213 App. Div. 82, 209 N.Y.Supp. 433 (1st Dep't 1925); Safffford v.
Kowalik, 278 App.Div. 604, 101 N.Y.S.2d 876 (3d Dep't 1951).
9. In re Crane, 164 N.Y. 71, 58 N.E. 47 (1900); Delaney v. McCormack, 88
N.Y. 174 (1882); In re Newkirk's Will, 233 App.Div. 168, 251 N.Y.Supp 337
(3d Dep't 1931).
10. Salter v. Drowne, 205 N.Y. 204, 98 N.E. 401 (1912); In re Fishel's
Estate, 167 Misc. 145, 3 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Surr.Ct. 1938) aif'd 256 App: Div. 915, 10
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1st Dep't 1939); In re Sayre's Will, 1 A.D.2d 475, 151 N.Y.S.2d 506
(4th Dep't 1956), aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 929, 161 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1957).
11. In re Sayre's Will, supra note 10 at 511.
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The Carlin will on its face contained no express language clearly excluding
testatrix's husband from a share in the remainder or directing that the distributees
be determined at a date later than testatrix's death. Therefore, unless such a
clear, direct intention was indicated by the will viewed in its entirety, the general
rule should have applied and the distributees should have been ascertained as of
the date of the testatrix's death. From a reading of the will in its entirety the
court found sufficient contrary intention to warrant disregard of the general rule.
It based its finding of intention on the incongruity which the granting of the
remainder to the testatrix's husband would cause. If testatrix's distributees were
determined at her death, her husband would then have taken all of her property
in fee. The court indicated that such a result would be incongruous with the plan
testatrix had established by giving him a life estate with a limited power of
invasion of principal. The fact that the limited power of invasion would be
meaningless if the husband took in fee was a crucial factor in the court's finding
of an intention that testatrix's heirs should be determined at her husband's death
rather than at her own death, as normally would be the case.
The court relied heavily on the discussion of incongruity in the Sayre case,
and discounted the effect of the substitutional nature of the gift in that case. On
the basis of cases before the Sayre case, the substitutional nature of the gift, rather
than the incongruity of results, would seem to be the sounder ground for that
decision. No case prior to the Carlin decision has delayed the determination
of distributees solely on the basis of incongruity, and for this reason the case
would seem to be a departure from, or at least an extension of, New York law
on the subject. The decision in this case raises two questions. First, was there
actually any clear intent shown with which the application of the normal rule
would be incongruous? The will was admittedly ambiguous as to the inclusion
or exclusion of testatrix's husband in the class. It would seem possible that her
intention, beyond providing for her husband, was to let the law of distribution
take its course in the distribution of her property. If such were her intention,
application of the normal rule would not be incongruous with that intention.
The greater discretion which this case accords to judges in implying intention and
disregarding established rules on the basis of the intention implied, is not conducive to stability and predictability in will construction. In some cases the
relaxed rule may result in closer approximation of the testator's actual intention;
however, in others, the courts may imply an intention contrary to the actual
intention of the testator and come to a result incongruous with his actual intention.
It would seem that unless a clearer intention than that indicated in the Carlin
will is shown, the law would be best served by the application of the established
rules of construction.
Secondly, even if the testatrix did intend to exclude her husband from the
class of distributees, did she intend that the determination of those distributees
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be delayed until his death? It is possible to imply from the will an intention
to exclude the husband from the remainder, but this is an exclusionary not a
donative intent. An intention to delay the determination of the distributees cannot
even be implied from the will. Without a showing of intention to delay, as
distinguished from an intention to exclude, the distributees should be determined
at testarix's death, whether or not the husband is excluded from those distributees.
A contrary result would fly in the face of testatrix's presumed intention, the rule
of early vesting, and the policy reasons behind that rule. In all, it would seem that
the grounds for excluding the husband in this case are weak, but the grounds for
delaying the determination of the distributees are almost nonexistent. On the
latter ground, if not the former, this case is a serious departure from existing law.
Alan Vogt
Defamation in PoliticalRadio Broadcasts:More Grist for the Mill
Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act provides in effect that, when
radio time is granted to a candidate for a political office, the station must grant
the use of its facilities under substantially the same conditions to opposing candidates.' Censorship of the speeches is forbidden but no station is required to
grant time for political speeches initially.2 A primary candidate for U.S. Senator
made use of a station following his opponent's speech. He and the radio station
were sued for libel. Held: The radio station is immune from suit since in,
prohibiting censorship, Congress could not have intended that a radio station
should be held liable for speech or statement over which it could have no controLC
Defamation by radio is generally determined by the law of libel, although
in some instances it has been construed to constitute slander or a completely new
4
and different tort.
Suits against radio stations for defamatory remarks made by political speakers
have been comparatively few and have resulted in conflicting rules. The divergence of opinion may be attributed both to different interpretations of section 315
1. 48 STAT. 1088 (1943), 47 U.S.C. §315 (1946).
2. Ibid.

3. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F.Supp. 928 (M. D. Tenn 1958).
4. Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 340, 243 N.W. 82 (1932) (libel); Hartmann
v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) (libel, material read from script);
Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Mfisc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (Sup.Ct. 1937) aff'd mem. 253
App.Div. 887, 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1938) (slander, ad lib); Summit Hotel v.
National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939) (ad lib, held neither
libel nor slander, but a different kind of defamation). A discussion of whether
defamation by radio is libel or slander is beyond the scope of the note. For a
general discussion, see Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34
IowA L. R. 12 (1948). For argument that it is neither libel nor slander, see
Newhouse, Defamation by Radio; A New Tort, 17 ORE. L.R. (1939).

